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Abstract
What was the role of consumption structure evolution in the industrialization phases of the
Western world since the 18th century? To answer this question, we rst ask the économical
ad histoical literature. We idetify the main phases of consumption structure evolution and
establish a plausible link between consumption structure evolutions and industrial revolutions.
In particular, we show that an industrial revolution starts with a "smithian growth process",
which is demand driven, and a "schumpeterian growth process" which is supply driven, one
the new techniques adopted. We then model the role of consumption habits evolution in
the schumpeterian growth process. Finally, we show that consumption habits evolutions can
be endogenously explained if we introduce, in an original way, the concept of "commercial
revolution", which appears to be mainly linked to schumpeterian growth processes..
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1 Introduction
Was consumption patterns evolution a key aspect in the various phases of industrialization of
the Western world since the 18th century? The debates about this question in economic history
are relatively recent but they only deal with the rst industrialization, ignoring larger periods,
including the following "revolutions". However, it seems worth studying the link between the
evolution of consumption habits and industrialization over longer periods in order to distinguish
what makes the specicity of the rst industrialization from possibly recurring mechanisms.
In this article, we defend the thesis that the evolution of consumption patterns plays a major
role not only in the emergence of new techniques but also in the adoption of a new growth regime,
once these new techniques are available. We also claim that the evolution of consumption habits
can be largely explained by mechanisms that we will identify as "commercial revolutions".
Our approach starts by exposing briey the related literature: we show in Section 2 that
economic history has not been able to propose denitive and consensual conclusions and we exhibit
the main questions that are addressed in this paper. We propose, in Section 3, to consider, in a
qualitative way, a plausible dynamic that links consumption evolutions and the development of
technical and productive systems. To this purpose, we identify the various consumption revolutions
since the 18th century and the context in which they emerge and develop. We highlight the role
played, at each period of industrial revolution, by a "Smithian" growth process (demand driven
and based on the "old" techniques) and by a "Schumpeterian" growth process (supply driven, the
new techniques being then available and progressively adopted). In Section 4, we model the link
between consumption evolutions and the adoption of a growth regime, within a "Schumpeterian"
process of growth. Finally, in Section 5, we show that the evolution of consumption habits can be
endogenously explained if we introduce, in an original way, the concept of "commercial revolution".
2 Problem statement
The main debates about the role of consumption in the industrial revolutions are particularly re-
cent1 : the historiography is indeed largely dominated by the supply side approaches [Verley, 1997a]
1 [McCracken, 1987] underlined the absence of a real history of consumption.
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and this fact remains true if we consider the most recent economic researches that aim at modeling
growth over long periods. These works are trying to build a unied theory of growth [Lucas, 2002],
explaining the transition from a "Malthusian" to a Solowian" growth regimes [Clark, 2003, Crafts, 2005].
They wonder about the mechanisms subtending the rst industrial revolution, its ineluctability and
the reasons of its advent in the Western world (and particularly in England).
To answer these questions, the models are generally based on the following di¤erence between
"malthusian" and the "solowian" growth regime: The rst is dened by a weak growth together
with a systematic increase in population that cancels any progression of living standards. The
second one is characterized by productivity rise and natality fall. To explain the transition between
those two regimes, two approaches have been considered. The rst approach is based on exogeneous
growth models: For example, the work of [North and Thomas, 1973] or [Jones, 2001] explains
the emergence of the industrial revolution in England by a specic and exogeneous evolution
of the institutions (property rights, in particular intellectual property...). This approach is also
used in the models of Becker et al. and of Lucas ([Becker et al., 1990] and [Lucas, 2002]) which
consider an exogeneous shock leading to human capital accumulation (where marginal productivity
is not decreasing). This accumulation makes then possible the "great escape" from the Malthusian
gowth trap. A second approach of the transition betwen Malthusian and Solowian regime rests
on endogenous growth models. Following this way, [Kremer, 1993] considers that knowledge grows
with the population size and its density. [Galor and Weil, 1990] preserve this idea as well as
the one of the non decreasing marginal productivity of human capital but introduce the growing
(and cumulative) interest, for the population, to invest in education and to reduce natality: the
"quality" of the children is then preferred to their "quantity"2 . Contrary to the previous works,
[Hansen and Prescott, 2002] claim that the transition from a Malthusian regime to a Solowian
one does not depend on natality matter but on the comparison of marginal productivities of a
land-using sector and of a land-free sector. [ORourke et al., 2005] make nally a kind of synthesis
by proposing a model in which two types of technologies coexist: labor-intensive technology and
knowledge-intensive one. For them, the rst one incites to high natality while the second incites
to invest in the childrens human capital.
This recent and intense work of modeling the changes occurred during the rst industrial
revolution. However, the models are debatable (cf. [Clark, 2003, Crafts, 2005]). But the most
surprising fact is that these models, as well as their criticisms, do not care (or very little) about
the role of consumption changes in the transition from a growth regime to the another, although
the techniques often preexisted to the industrial revolution and their di¤usion was relatively free.
As far as we know, among recent work, only the one by [Voigtländer and Voth, 2005] takes this
aspect into account. It shows that industrialization results from the existence of a critical mass
of su¢ ciently rich consumers, able to a¤ord goods of mass consumption. Following this analysis,
the advance of England during the industrial revolution could be explained by the existence of a
generous enough welfare state system (Poor Law, in particular). The income distribution is then a
key variable which is however not su¢ cient to explain a possible divergence between two countries
having comparable income distributions.
Except the article of [Gilboy, 1932], the oldest articles about the role of consumption during the
industrialization have been written at the end of the 1960s (see [Boserup, 1965]) and especially
in the 1980s and 1990s. A seminal thesis for a demand side approach of the industrial revolu-
tion is the one of "creative pressure", proposed by [Boserup, 1965], in response to the Malthusian
view. For her, demographic growth is favorable to technical and economic progress: indeed, demo-
graphic growth would lead to a more intensive use of land and to the adoption of new agricultural
2 [Galor and Moav, 2002] propose a comparable model in which technical progress is not any more a function of
the population size. In their model, the engine of the industrial revolution is the evolution of the parentspreferences
for their childrens human capital, through a natural selection mechanism.
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techniques. In turn, this adoption of new techniques results in an increasing productivity of the
agricultural sector [Bairoch, 1997]. It would then generate a decrease in the agricultural relative
prices [Hudson, 1992] and an evolution in the global income and in its distribution, favorable to
industrial goods consumption3 . The innovation can then be interpreted as an answer to the limits
of the productive system. The size of the population, and thus the needs for consumption, would
then determine the level of wealth and not the contrary: A too low demographic density would
prevent the economy from adopting new techniques. However, [Lindert, 1983] points out that this
theory should also explain the reasons of the increase in population: if it is possible to consider
an exogeneous reduction in the death rate, then the industrialization can be regarded as demand
driven. If, on the contrary, the death rate evolution is directly related to economical and technolog-
ical progress, then the validity of Boserup conclusion is not guaranteed. Moreover [Mokyr, 1993]
underlines that, if technology are xed, growth theory shows that an increase in population implies
a decrease in the per capita income, which is, due to Engel law, unfavorable to industrial goods
consumption. [Crafts, 1985] also underlines, for similar reasons, that a demand driven approach
of the industrial revolution is not very plausible.
A few recent empirical studies also contribute to challenge the idea of a demand driven indus-
trialization. Indeed, [Horrell, 1996] underlines that the consumption of industrial goods remained
largely (but not completely4) limited by the unsatisfaction of vital needs. Therefore, according
to her, the rise of the agricultural productivity had a limited impact on the working class. Thus,
agricultural progress and capital accumulation appear to be key issues in order to overcome the
nutritional constraints [Toutain, 1971] and to allow a development of industrial goods consumption
[Bairoch, 1963, Komlos and Artzrouni, 1990, Komlos and Artzrouni, 2003]. The industrial revolu-
tion could thus be interpreted as the denitive escape from the Malthusian trap thanks to an
exogeneous increase in the saving rate and thanks to a reduction of the mortality crises. How-
ever the (very few5) empirical studies on consumption habits do not allow drawing any convincing
conclusion to the various debates: [Clark et al., 1995] support that food expenditure increased
relatively slowly compared to the real wage: the evolution of wage would have been mainly fa-
vorable to industrial products. On the contrary, [Horrell, 1996] supports the opposite thesis, also
using budgets of households. Several studies even concluded to the absence of a signicant in-
crease of agricultural real incomes and of productivity. And even the trend of relative prices is
not consensual [Mokyr, 1985]. Lastly, although agricultural progress but also new tachniques for
transportation (cf. [Szostak, 1991]) led to an increase of the demand favorable to industrialization,
technical progress and supply sides factors would remain in ne the source of the economic changes
that generated the rst industrial revolution [Mokyr, 1985, Mokyr, 1993].
Another debate concerning the link between consumption and industrialization rests on the
impact of a possible evolution of income distribution: even if industrialization induced rising
inequalities6 , [Verley, 1997b] considers that a larger development of middle classes in England and
in the United States provides an explanation of the dynamism of these economies while others
(like the French one) were characterized by a stronger bipolarism betwen rich an poor people.
However, empirical results appear to be contradictory [Lindert and Williamson, 1983] and authors
like [Hudson, 1992, Feinstein, 1988, Feinstein, 1998, Horrell, 1996] contest a large part of these
conclusions. Nevertheless, [Horrell, 1996] recognizes that while the evolution of working class
3See, for example, [Eversley, 1966, Williamson, 1985, Berg, 1991], contested by [Mokyr, 1985, Feinstein, 1988,
OBrien, 1985]. This idea can be compared to the one of Engels law [Engel, 1857] (see also [Zimmerman, 1932])
which results from the following empirical observations: households with higher incomes have a lower share of their
consumption budget dedicated to food.
4See [de Vries, 1993], p.114-121.
5We are talking here about recent historical researches. For older works, see [Stigler, 1954].
6By using the peoples height as an indicator of economic welfare, [Fogel et al., 1983] as well as
[Steckel and Floud, 1997] conrm Kuznetss results, i.e. an increase in inequalities and a signicant decrease of
incomes for the poorest people during the rst stages of economic growth of the modern time.
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living conditions was not favorable to industrialization, the one of middle class was favorable to
industrialization
In fact, many indices let think that it would be a mistake to ignore the social and cultural
dimensions while studying the mechanisms that governed the rst industrialization. Indeed,
they represent an important basis of consumers choices [Berg, 2004] that many authors consid-
ered as a fundamental key in the industrialization [McKendrick, 1974, McKendrick et al., 1982,
Brewer and Porter, 1993, de Vries, 1993, de Vries, 1994]. McKendrick et al., for instance, consider
that the 18th century was, even before the industrialization, at the heart of important changes
in consumption habits: the "consumer revolution" appears moereover to be a phenomenon both
relatively independent from supply side and necessary to industrialization. De Vries considers
that a revolution in peoples minds led to higher labor supply, and particularly women and chil-
dren labor supply. This induced higher consumption, mainly favorable to manufactured goods.
However, whereas McKendrick et al. locate these changes "together" with the industrial revo-
lution, de Vries locates them before (1600-1750)7 . The "industrious revolution" appears to be
a key element of the [Mendels, 1972]s proto-industrialization. But this thesis is also challenged
[Clark and Vand Der Werf, 1998]. While it remains di¢ cult to establish a consensus on the link
between domestic consumption and industrial revolution [Mokyr, 1985, Mokyr, 1993], it is also dif-
cult to contest the fact that social emulation highlighted by McKendrick et al. cannot be denied:
as we pointed out, [Horrell, 1996] (and other authors8) recognizes the possible role of middle class
demand for the industrial goods in industrialization.
Even Mokyr, who is convinced by a supply side approach, recognizes that the evolution of
the preferences and the "industrious revolution" could have played a signicant role in industrial
dynamics. The evolution of the preferences is in fact an essential aspect of industrialization since
it provides keys to understand the important choices between close substitutes: this aspect is
very important since many goods cannot integrate new techniques (linen and wool, for example)
while others (like cotton) can. [North, 1990] also stressed that technical innovations and changes
are initially determined by the size of the market9 . It is thus a mistake to set the demand side
approach against the supply side one as welle as not taking into account the impact of the evolution
of individual and social behaviors: the absence of outlets is obviously a handicap for innovation
and industrialization. Moreover, consumersbehaviors can play an "active" role in the economic
processas well10 . Since [Crafts, 1996] shows that the industrial revolution is not characterized by
a high growth rate but by in depth structural changes, we believe that part of the explanation of
the slow growth can also be explained by the inertia of consumption behaviors. This is at least an
hypothesis that we make after this presentation of the controversial debates.
3 The evolution of consumption structures: a key aspect of
industrialization phases
3.1 The main ruptures in consumption since the 18th century
In contrary to [Mukerji, 1983] or [Shammas, 1993]s works which locate the ruptures in consump-
tion habits respectively in the 15th and 16th centuries and in to the 16th and 17th centuries11 ,
our research will focus on the period starting with the 18th century. We identify three phases of
7See also [Voth, 1998] about the 1750-1800 period.
8See also [Crafts, 1985] and [Verley, 1997b, Verley, 1997a].
9 [North, 1990], p.75.
10 [Berg, 2004] stresses that theoretical ([Bianchi, 1998], Becker, 1991) and empirical (Bowden & O¤er, 1990,
[Bresnahan and Gordon, 1997]) progress show the active role of the consumer.
11Between 1650 and 1750, for example, tobacco, products derived from sugar (see [Mintz, 1991]) or co¤e based
drinks reached a level of wide consumption, if we put aside disparities among the population.
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deep changes in consumption patterns in the Occident: the "consumer revolution"12 , the "con-
sumer goods revolution"13 and the "mass consumption revolution"14 . This work constitutes a rst
contribution. It allows us to exhibit on the one hand a plausible link between these ruptures and
the industrial revolutions (Section 3.2) and, on the other hand, plausible mechanisms that could
explain the ruptures in consumption (Section 5).
3.1.1 The consumer revolution (18th century)
The rst signicant evolutions of consumers spending habits can rst be met in the United Kingdom
and in the Thirteen Colonies but also, to a lower extent, in France and in a few Germanic regions,
between the end of the 17th century and the end of the 18th century. These changes concern the
market homogeneity, the nature of goods on the market and the volume of sales.
Several authors contribute to support this view ([Rule, 1992], p.252). For many of them, these
changes can be seen as a consumer revolution that happens before and during the industrial revolu-
tion: According to [Eversley, 1966] or [McKendrick et al., 1982] it took place within the last quarter
of the 18th century in England and in the Thirteen Colonies (see also [Brewer and Porter, 1993]).
The revolution involved initially a few goods answering to the most elementary needs (feeding and
clothing, of course, but also housing goods), involving the development of industries concerned.
The main improvements concern food, with qualitative changes (diversication)15 . They also
concern the expenditure for house comfort (mirrors, curtains, earthenware and porcelain (instead
of metal) and culinary hardware) that signicantly increase as shown by after death inventory
lists. As for clothing, the kitchen goods constitute a part of the qualitative changes favorable to
demand growth: expensive and resistant goods are replaced by breakable and less expensive ones,
replacing progressively the second-hand market by renewing market. We can note that, at that
time,"consumption evolves from a stocking durable goods mentality to a ow of purchase of less
durable goods, which is very favorable to the industrial mass production"16 .
The expansion of the textile industry (for clothing but also housing) is undoubtedly the most
spectacular one17 (Table 1). The case of clothing is particularly interesting since it is one of the
most important symbols of social distinction and it rapidly concerns all the social classes: indeed,
Indian textile (colored cotton tissues) is lighter and, above all, much less expensive. It thus incites
people to renew and to diversify their clothes [Chapman and Chassagne, 1981]. Fashion is not
then any more very far and it became possible for textile producers to exploit peoples attraction
for modernity renewing rather fastly the design and colors of the tissus.
Period 1700-1760 1760-1770 1770-1780 1780-1790
Annual growth rate (%) 1.4 4.6 6.2 12.8
Table 1: Annual growth rate in the English Coton industry in the 18th century. From Verley
(1997a), p.176.
Finally, mostly the sectors of food products, textile, furnishing and dwelling goods benet from
this consumer revolution. They will play a central role in the rst industrial revolution.
12 [Brewer and Porter, 1993, McKendrick et al., 1982, Eversley, 1966, Thirsk, 1978] (Thirsk dates back the "con-
sumer society" to the 17th century). See also [Verley, 1997b], p. 114.
13See [Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985, Caron, 1985, Verley, 1996, Fraser, 1981, Musson, 1978], chapitre 13.
14See, for instance, [Marseille, 1996, Babeau, 1991]. Seen also [Baudrillard, 1970].
15Cf. [Toutain, 1971], for the French case.
16 [Verley, 1997a], p.31.
17Cf. [Roche, 1981, Roche, 1988, Roche, 1989, Roche, 1997] and [Verley, 1997b].
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3.1.2 The revolution of consumer goods (1850-1950)
In the middle of the 19th century, consumption patterns already changed a lot. The 1850-1914
period, in spite of the Great depression18 , constitutes a second phase of more or less vigorous
changes of consumption habits, depending on countries19 . The period which precedes the Great
depression is a continuation of the consumer revolution while the period after the Great depression
is a new period of change of consumption patterns, characterized, particularly in the United States,
by the emergence of the second industrialization goods. In France, the transition between the two
periods occurs about 1885, when feeding constraints of sedentary populations weaken, allowing
income increases to determine new consumption habits20 . Indeed, prices decrease and innovations
keeps accelerating, consumer credit develops21 and real wage increase for people who kept their job
during the crisis of 1880-189522 . The progressive transition from a seasonal work to more stable
jobs also contributes, despite the chronic unemployment, to transform consumption patterns.
The end of the century is then characterized by better housing conditions and by a new phase
of development of clothing consumption [Roche, 1981, Roche, 1988, Roche, 1989, Roche, 1997],
second hand market being largely replaced in the 1880s and 1890s23 . It is also characterized by
a better education and the development of leisures. New consumption habits are born: traveling
becomes easier thanks to the train (the number of passengers takes o¤ after 1840-1850 in France
[Toutain, 1971]). Among countries which benet from these changes, the United States appear to
be more and more in advance: In the United States, the car is already a mass market in the 1920s
whereas France will only reach this consumption level in the 1960s. After 1895, the end of the
crisis is distinguished by much higher living standards and by the development of half-luxury for
the middle class that wants to imitate higher standards of consumption even if it cannot a¤ord
real artisanal luxury goods24 .
3.1.3 The mass consumption revolution (1950-1980)
The time of consumption industries descibed by [Marseille, 1996] is the one of the major changes
in consumption habits. These changes happen after World War II in Europe and between World
War I and World War II in the United States25 .
18Neither Germany nor the United States were really touched by the economic crises that we could observe in
England and France during the 1880s, for example.
19See [Verley, 1996], p.99-106 and [Verley, 1997b], p.128. [Le Play, 1857]s work already shows how important are
the changes happening between 1850 and 1862: the coe¢ cient of feeding in French craftsmen households budgets
decreased from 64,7% to 53,7%, the one of textile increased from 17,5 to 19,5% (despite a signicant decrease of
prices in this sector). The other expenditure also increased from 5,5 to 14,1%. See also [Dauphin and Pezerat, 1975].
20 [Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985], p.37. See also [Crafts and Mills, 1994] for England: if the index is 100
in 1900, they show that real wages are 44 in 1840, 67 in 1870, 89 in 1890 and 102 in 1910.
21 In 1907, consumer credit concerns 57% of Parisian households in their recurring expenditures
[Gelpi and Julien-Labruyère, 1994].
22Even in France, consumption doesnt seem to slow down during most part of the second half of the 19th century:
per capita consumption increased from 245-290 F before 1850 to 335 F in 1850-1859 and to 450-455 F in the 1860s
([Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985], p.23. See also [Fraser, 1981]). Paid work widened within the family but
more in higher income employees families than in working class families according to [Halbwachs, 1921]. See also
[Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985], p.39-41. Real prices of the most current textiles dropped by 60 to 75%
between 1826 and 1874 and still by 30% between 1901 and 1906. Only the house rents increased, tripling between
1841 and 1891. On the whole, the living cost drops and the incomes increase, o¤ering a greater freedom to consume
([Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985], p.37-38). See also [Verley, 1996].
23The evolution is particularly important in the working class that su¤ered of the "cotton famine" and of the
1870 war. Cf [Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985] and [Verley, 1996], p.104-107.
24Galvanoplasty allows, for example, to manufacture costless gildings and other bronze-like products, allowing
middle classes to imitate the consumption of the richer people.
25The mass consumption develoment occured in the United State in the 1920s and accelerated after World Wor
II.
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In the thirty years following the Second world war, the GNP increased as much as in the
whole 19th century and the purchasing power was multiplied by ve, thus allowing a big rise of
the households demand and a diversication of consumed goods and services26 . This revolution of
consumption patterns is also characterized, for many goods, by a convergence of spending patterns,
independently from the living standards: it is the case for feeding, health, car, heating or lighting.
On the contrary, cultural expenditures, leisures and traveling remain largely dependent on the
incomes convergence: only people with the same income have the same habits for these specic
goods or services [Babeau, 1991].
In addition to the increasing consumption of commercial goods and services, the period is also
characterized by the wide increasing consumption of non-commercial services related to collective
services (administration, health, culture, education...). The ways of life changed (women paid work
increased), leading to new habits such as the replacement of self production by purchased consump-
tion. In all those changes, durable goods (car, television and electric household appliances27) play
a crucial role. It is also the case of leisure that now takes an important place in peoples habits and
that can be regarded as a real innovation in the peoples way of life. But, contrary to the generally
accepted ideas, increase in services consumption is slow (in volume), even if they progress a lot in
the household budget. In fact, a part of the services grew a lot (those related to housing and to
health or nancial services) whereas others grew weakly and sometimes decreased. It is the case
when durable goods consumption is a substitute of previous existing services28 .
Finally, even if it is not the case for the whole consumption (such as clothing or holidays
consumption), the mass consumption revolution can be characterized by an important convergence
of living standards and thus a signicant homogenization of consumption patterns.
3.2 Three productive regimes, three consumption revolution: what do
we learn?
3.2.1 Three productive regimes between the 18th century and today
We identied historic phases in which the evolution of consumption habits accelerated. In a
similar way, it is possible to put to the fore major phases of industrialization and of technical
progress29 . The delimitation of those phases is of course inevitably debatable. It is helpful however
to highlight regularities and to formulate a few useful assumptions. In this article, we decide to
follow the delimitation proposed by [Dockès, 2002]. In his work, he proposes rst to adopt another
terminilogy than "industrial revolution", replacing it by "productive regime" which indicates "the
relative consistency between an economic system (with its technical features), the labor division
patterns, the social relations (type of capital accumulation) and its "governance" processes"30 .
The productive regime is thus consistent with the technical system31 and with the economic and
social organization.
According to Dockès, we can distinguish three productive regimes (and not ve as suggested
in the Schumpeterian analysis of the economic cycles): 1) the one of steam (railway included),
2) the one of electricity, new chemistry, steel metallurgy, gas engine and telephone and 3) the
one of Information and Communication Techniques (ICT). Thus the three revolutions result in
26 [Babeau, 1991], p.425. See also [Lévy-Leboyer and Casanova, 1991], p.7.
27Cf. [INSEE, 1981] for French consumption. Note that the number of classes in products national classications
took o¤ at that time.
28Theaters regressed with the advent of television, just like the laundry and dyeworks expenditure when electric
household appliances developed or just like collective transport expenditure with the emergence of the individual
car.
29See, for instance, [Maddison, 2001, Caron, 1997, Mokyr, 1999, Dockès, 2002].
30 [Dockès, 2002], p.82-83.
31See [Gille, 1978].
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the transition from the old economic organization to the "manufacturing capitalism" (1770-1873),
then to the "organized capitalism" (1873-1970) including the "fordism regime", and nally to the
"neocapitalism". The latter productive regime was born from a wave of innovations (ICT) which
emerged in the 1940s and developed until forming a technical system in the 1980s32 . Finally,
redening the temporal limits of industrialization leads to three plausible productive regimes (that
we will also keep calling industrial revolutions), partially overlapping but each one representing a
particular form of economic, institutional, technological and social organization.
3.2.2 Lessons learnt
At each industrialization phase, changes have been stronger in the countries characterized by
signicant the evolution of consumption habits on a particular range of goods33 . But if we suggest
here much more than a simple correlation between industrial and nal households consumption
dynamics, we must also take into account the historical chronology of the observed evolutions:
the changes in consumption habits happen before and during the adoption of the new productive
regimes. Indeed, if we put aside the case of railway which is between two technical systems and
whose role was initially to homogenize the national markets, we can note that 1) in the 18th
century, the consumption of clothes (particularly indian clothes) increased before Watts patent
about steam machine; 2) in the middle of the 19th century, an acceleration in consumption changes
can be observed before the adoption of the "new" technical system related to the wave of innovation
that emerged at the end of the century; 3) in the middle of the 20th century, mass consumption
started before the emergence of the key features of the technical system characterized by electronics,
communication, data processing and new ICT.
This observation appears to be particularly signicant since recent historiographic work weaken
the old view concerning the industrial revolution: the adoption of mechanization and of steam ma-
chine was slow, even in England, and initially (until the middle of the 19th century), the industrial
revolution happened largely without modifying dramatically the old labor organization. Therefore
the reinterpretation of [Wrigley, 1988]s thesis by [Verley, 1997b] appears particularly interesting.
Moreover, this reinterpretation is, in our opinion, generalizable to all the identied phases of in-
dustrialization. For [Wrigley, 1988], the British economy initially developed improving the existing
productive system. This "organic" (or "Smithian") growth process would have encounter its limits
around 1760. Reaching a "stationary state", the nature of growth would have changed, leading
then to the adoption of innovations, of new labor organizations and of new types of energy (min-
eral energy). This "Schumpeterian" growth process would be the period of the adoption of the
modern industry in England. Due to chronology reasons, this thesis is very debatable. But the
existence of two "successive" processes of growth remains relevant if we consider another point of
view: the Smithian growth process would be demand driven whereas the Schumpeterian growth
process would nd an explanation on the supply side factors.
According to this assumption, the industrial revolution would not thus originate in the con-
junction of a technical revolution, a minimum level of capital accumulation, a labor availability
and of new energy and raw material sources. It would result rst from the emergence of new (inte-
rior and external) outlets and from a better use of the existing techniques and organization34 . As
this process reaches its limits, the economy would have switch from the "Smithian" regime to the
"Schumpeterian" regime. This new "Schumpeterian" regime is characterized by a supply driven
process: autonomous technical progress development, prot reinvestment, management rational-
ization to take into account the increasing size of the rms (more regular work but less directly
32See also [Freeman and Louca, 2001] on the particular importance of ICT for industrial dynamics.
33See [Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985, Verley, 1996] and [Davis, 1956, Davis, 1962,
Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986, Verley, 1997b, Verley, 1999].
34 [Verley, 1997b], p.107. Concerning the demand driven revolution, see also [Grenier, 1996], p.77.
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related to the demand side). And the transition between the Smithian and the Schumpeterian
regimes results in the adoption of innovations that solves a problem concerning the production
capacities and the increase in prices of production factors (raw material, energy, labor...). It was
the case in the industries like chemistry, iron and steel or textile, in which the fast growth of the
demand side led to many innovations. Then, growth is not anymore demand driven (as in the
Smithian regime) but supply driven. The increasingly important supply side becomes thus limited
by the size of the markets. Therefore the rms are looking for foreign trade: the second half of the
19th century is, for instance, characterized by a wide globalization of the markets in England and
France, supporté by the development of the rail.
The existence of these two processes (Smithian and Schumpeterian) allows us to propose an
interesting interpretation of the main historical phases of industrialization and provides a plausible
explanation of the di¤erences between countries in terms of development A stronger pressure of the
demand for Indian style texiles contributed to explain the English advance, compared to France.
Indeed, the French society of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century appeared strongly
bipolarized when compared to the English society: On the one hand the high society, very rich
but sparse (characterized by a strong propensity to save and by conspicuous and not very elastic
consumption), and on the other hand the very large part of the population, very poor, consuming
mainly food. The middle class, favorable to the development of a "middle range" consumption
(half-luxury goodscf. [Verley, 1996]), was very reduced. It is however the most important one for
industrialization. Conversely, at the time of the electrication, during the second industrialization,
England su¤ered from its advance in the gas di¤usion: The electricity demand was indeed less
elastic to prices than in other countries35 .
However an interesting di¤erence exists between the rst, the second and the third productive
regimes: The adoption of new goods is much more complex when it creates radically new use:
the price-elasticity can become su¢ ciently strong only if the prices are decreasing under a given
threshold that allows a broad access to the product for large population. The large adoption of a
product also requires the creation of new desires through the social and the commercial system (or
through consumer self experiences). As the (often radical) innovations of the second industrializa-
tion became adopted, they contributed to transform the consumption structures and to produce
a new demand. It is the case with transport as a product (traveling, also for tourism...), but also
as an homogenization factor of the markets (consumer goods and consumption habits di¤usion).
The train also contributed indirectely to favor car consumption (a key aspect of the second indus-
trialization) since it strongly developed transportation habits during the second half of the 18th
century [Toutain, 1967]. In the same way, electricity, for example, appears to answer demand for
several products[Cardot, 1987]: Lighting the cities, urban transportation, engines in the factories
or communication. Directly or indirectly demand driven, electricity is also the synonymous of
amazements and passions for a signicant part of the population. It is another way for technics
to inuence consumers behaviors and thus to product a new demand. Finally, electricity satises
needs, even if those needs were not initially expressed. The technical development, with its strong
social and cultural contents, thus contributes to the production of the expression of new needs,
especially when the social environment is curious and receptive. When the consumers desires are
nally expressed and the electricity di¤usion on the network becomes possible thanks to techni-
cal progress, electricity benets from a strong price-elasticity and from a signicant and durable
productivity gains. Its consumption can thus take o¤ and become mass consumption. Indeed,
techniques can produce the conditions of the development of a mass consumption.
It seems thus that the important role of the evolution of consumption habits in the advent of a
productive regime is not of the same type throughout the considered periods. In many phases of the
industrialization process, techniques are consumption patterns driven. In others, the evolution of
35Cf. Mustar in [Cardot, 1987].
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consumption habits is partly technology driven, contributing to produce a new demand. However,
this analysis of this dialectical relation that can be applied to the various phases of industrialization,
should be completed: on the one hand by identifying the macroeconomic mechanisms and on
the other hand by stressing the respective roles of technical and commercial revolutions in the
production of a new demand.
4 Growth, consumption structures and products integrat-
ing new techniques: a model for Schumpeterian growth
process
In this article, we model the role of the consumption structures evolution within a Schumpeterian
growth process, since we suppose that techniques are available for all the countries. In the model,
we dene a growth regime by the "main" macroeconomic variables, i.e. economic growth rate,
employment growth rate as well as the "attitude of the economy" concerning innovation, that we
will dene below.
When an existing technical system is destabilized by the introduction of new techniques [Gille, 1978],
the economy is in front of what we will call a technical shock. This shock can induce various growth
regimes. For example, the introduction of steam machine in the 18th and in the 19th centuries was
not done in the same way in England and in France and these two countries were not characterized
by the same prosperity. They do not adopt the same growth regime at that time. We could also
note that the United States and Europe do not adopt the same growth regime either during the
20th century.
4.1 The model
4.1.1 The consumption function of a product "p"
As in macroeconomic tradition, we model a consumption depending on the current income. How-
ever, we take into account many critiscms related to this approach (in particular the life cycle
hypothesis). We suppose indeed that consumption evolution does not depend directly on the evo-
lution of the total income (

Yt
36) but of its components: the evolution of the income depends on
the one of created jobs (

Lct), suppressed jobs (

Lst ), of wage (

!t) and of the prots generated by the
capital (
dctYt37). For a budget coe¢ cient, we thus write:

Cp;t = p
c
L

!t

Lct

+ psL

!t

Lst

+ p!
 
!tLt

+ pp
dctYt (1)
where Cp;t is the consumption of a product "p" and pcL; p
s
L; p!; pp are the propensities to consume
the product "p" when the income varies respectively because of job creations, job suppressions,
wage rise or prot increase. Indeed, the originality of our assumption is to consider that the various
components of the global income do not have the same impact on consumption evolution of a given
product.
Two justications can be argued about this assumption. The rst one is a "sociological" ar-
gument, related to peoples "preferences": it is not surprising that consumption depends on the
di¤erences between people. In our model, we do not take into account directly the traditional
36 If Xt is a variable depending on t, we denote

Xt =
dXt
dt
.
37 ct =
Yt !tLt
Yt
indicates the prot share, Lt being the level of employment.
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di¤erences between social classes [Duesenberry, 1949, Veblen, 1899] but the agents position re-
garding "works" (which is a social activity38). The second argument is an economic one since
the agents, by optimizing their intertemporal consumption, can change their consumption habits
depending on the evolution of their anticipations. Thus, an agent anticipating the lost of his job
will be probably less laid out to spend its income in products integrating the new techniques than
an agent anticipating to get a job or anticipating an increase of its income due to wage rising. Each
one of these agents can be regarded as if they were in a di¤erent phase of their "life cycle": the
agents getting a job at period t are often young people or people who recently received educational
training. Their consumption behavior must thus be di¤erent from that of agents loosing a job and
which are generally older or owing a lower education training 39 . Let us note nally that propensi-
ties to consume also reect (partly and indirectly) the level of the inequalities regarding the income
distribution in the considered country: it seems indeed reasonable to think that a country creating
little paid and unskilled jobs does not have same propensity to consume products integrating the
new techniques than a country creating only very skilled and well paid jobs.
Lastly, since propensities to consume can be interpreted as the sensibility of a consumer category
(for instance, regarding pcL, consumers nding a job at period t) to use an increase in his income
for the purchase of the product p. Therefore we can consider that propensities to consume are
good indicators of the preferences of the various consumers categories for the considered product.
4.1.2 industrial revolutions and products integrating new techniques
We propose to distinguish now, using the previous assumption, the products integrating the new
techniques from the traditional goods through the three following assumptions.
1. We suppose that the various population categories will adopt signicantly di¤erent attitudes
concerning products integrating new techniques.
2. The consumption share, in the production, of the goods integrating the new techniques
increases with time because prices are decreasing (as for cotton in the 18th century) or
because of the emergence of radically new techniques (like electricity at the end of the 19th
century). This is expressed by:

Cp;t
Cp;t
=

Yt
Yt
3. When an agent who is getting a job and when an employee receive one additional euro, the
rst one spends a larger part of this euro in order to purchase goods integrating the new
techniques than the second one:
pcL > p!
This last point can be explained by considering the two following cases.
 1st case: the industrial revolutions for which the new techniques are integrated into the
production of traditional goods (for example textiles, in the 18th century ). In this case,
when a new job is created, it can be given to an agent which had already a job, to an
38Let us note that some research [Herpin and Verger, 1999] shows with another point of view that, at microeco-
nomic level, the impact of work status on consumption.
39With a a radically di¤erent model, our approach has thus a remote link with the Ando, Modigliani and Brum-
bergs life cycle theory.
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agent which never had a job or to an agent which already had a job but who lost it. In
the rst case the essential motivation of the agent is the improvement of his welfare level
(and thus an increasing consumption of products integrating the new techniques). In the
second case, following the life cycle hypothesis, the agents are getting equipped in products
integrating the new techniques. In the third case, we can suppose that the mechanisms
of social imitation lead to an acceleration of products integrating the new techniques con-
sumption [Duesenberry, 1949, Veblen, 1899]. Finally, let us note that a signicant number
of job creations correspond to female work at the time of the rst industrial revolution (cf.
[de Vries, 1993, McKendrick, 1974]) but also during the following ones. They largely con-
tribute to develop the new products consumption. Finally, in each case, we can suppose that
an additional unit of money will be the more consumed for products integrating the new
techniques by people getting a job than by the average employee, already equipped and/or
saving for its old days. This reasoning leads us to conclude that: pcL > p!;
 2nd case: the industrial revolutions characterized by complex and radically new goods (as
in the case of electricity [Cardot, 1987]). Assuming that the employees average income is
higher than the one of households getting a job, we should deduce from Engels law that
the consumption of less essential products, and thus the one of radically new products, is
reserved to the richest households. The average employee should then consume more products
integrating the new techniques than people getting a job. However, it seems reasonable to
suppose that radically new and complex products needs specic consumer skills depending
on age of people or of the last educational training. For instance, young people are more able
to use ICT because they are trained to use these tools than the average employee. Thus,
assuming that the agents nding a job in period t are better prepared to consume products
integrating the new techniques (because they are young or because their educational training
is recent), we thus have: pcL > p!.
4.1.3 Consumption structures and other hypotheses
Let t =
CNt
Yt
be the consumption structure (where CNt =
P
Cp;t
p
- The sum is taken over all the
products integrating the new techniques). We thus have40 :

CNt = p
c
L

!t

Lct

+ psL

!t

Lst

+ p!
 
!tLt

+ pp
dctYt
where pcL; p
s
L; p!; pp are the propensities to consume the products integrating the new techniques
related to the various income sources.
Hypothesis 1 consumer preferences are mainly changing in the long run [Braudel, 1979a, Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985].
We assume thus that the propensities are constant.
Hypothesis 2 products integrating the new techniques are not inferior goods. Thus: pcL > 0;
psL < 0; p! > 0; pp > 0.
Hypothesis 3 agents loosing their jobs anticipated their income decrease and thus reduce, as
Engels law prediction, non essential expenditures. We thus have: pcL > jpsLj. The justications
concerning the "pcL > p!" hypothesis are also justications of this claim.
40Since we will not use anymore Cp;t, we use the same notaions (pcL; p
s
L; p! ; pp) for the propensities to consume
related to CNt .
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4.1.4 Growth regimes and industrial revolutions
Using [Villemeur, 2004]s framework, we distinguish two types of investments according to their
macroeconomic properties.
The growth investments (INt ) are characterized by production increase and job creations, mod-
eled by Equations 4 and 6 (see below). We suppose that growth investments are mainly the
investments for products integrating the new techniques and for traditional products for which
demand is growing.
The rationalization investments41 (IRt ) are characterized by capital/labor substitution, pro-
duction being constant. These investments destroying jobs are modeled by the Equation 7 (see
below)42 .
The distinction between the two categories of investment is close to the one between capacity
investments and process investments43 : by denition, capacity investments aim at producing new
products and/or to increase the production of existing goods. Process investments are character-
ized by an improvement of the production process. They aim at improving products quality and
productivity and at reducing costs. Rationalization investments are thus primarily process invest-
ments whereas growth investments can both contain capacity and process investments (particularly
when new processes contribute to increase signicantly the production or its quality).
In our model, the growth regime will be dened by xNt . The larger this value is (tending
towards 1), the more the economy adopts innovations, the more it is industrializing, and the more
it is growing and creating jobs. The intensity of an industrial revolution depends of the countrys
growth path: does the country reach the highest possible growth regime and does the country
remain a long time at the same regime.
We then model the representative producer behavior by a rm minimizing the production cost
increase (

\Costt = !t

Lt +

!tLt + q
r
t It) per produced unit, under limited rationality constraints.
At each time t, a decision is taken concerning two variables: xNt which describes the investment
structure and "ct which describes the economys policy e¤ectiveness regarding employment. We
suppose that, due to imperfect information, producers consider that the following variables are
exogeous ones: the investment rate (it), the prot share (ct), the wage growth rate (

!t
!t
) as well as
the anticipated cost of the job creations per unit of capital (taking into account the shareholders
required protability, qrt
44). The optimization program is thus:
Min
264

\Costt
Yt
375 under constraints: it = c1;t ct = c2;t !t!t = c3;t!tLt"ctxNt itqrt
ctYt
= c4;t x
N
t 2 ]0; 1] "ct 2 ]0; "maxc ]
(2)
where the ck;t, k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, are exogeneous variables (i.e. depending only of time).
41The emigration from Europe during the 19th century is a symptom of job destructions and of not enough job
creations.
42To simplify the model, instead of writing

Lst
Lt
= "st
 
1  xNt

it where ("st ) is the job destructions coe¢ cient, we
will suppose that there is a maximum coe¢ cient of job creations ("maxc ) and that coe¢ cients "
c
t and "
s
t vary in a
symmetrical way: a policy favorable to employment also contributes to limit the jobs destruction. We thus pose
"st = "
max
c   "ct .
43This distinction is proposed or studied, more or less directly, in [Van Duijn, 1979, Mensch, 1979,
Schumpeter, 1935, ?, Lorenzi and Bourlès, 1995, Villemeur, 2004]. Capacity investments result from a product in-
novation or an increasing demand for existing products. The process investments correspond to process innovations
leading to the production of the same goods (or substitutes).
44The anticipated cost of job creations per unit of capital is thus written, according to the equation 6, !t

Lct
Kt
=
!tLt"
c
tx
N
t itq
r
t
ctYt
.
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In particular, we deduce from that optimization the Equation 9 (see below), which establishes
the relation between the evolution of consumption structures and the adopted growth structures.
In the following, we will also suppose that producers anticipations concerning the demand for
products integrating new technologies inuences the adoption of a growth regime.

CNt = p
c
L

!t

Lct

+ psL

!t

Lst

+ p!
 
!tLt

+ pp
dctYt (3)

Yt = pcI
N
t = pcx
N
t It (4)

Yt
Yt
= pcx
N
t it (5)

Lct
Lt
= "ctx
N
t it (6)

Lst
Lt
= ("maxc   "ct)
 
1  xNt

it (7)

Lt
Lt
=

Lct  

Lst
Lt
=
 
"ctx
N
t   ("maxc   "ct)
 
1  xNt

it (8)
"ct = "
max
c x
N
t avec "
max
c > 0 (9)
Variable name Denition
Yt Production (GDP)
INt Growth investments
pc Productivity of growth investments.
xNt =
INt
It
2 [0; 1] Share of growth investments in total investment
It = I
N
t + I
R
t Total investment
IRt Rationalization investments
Lct Created jobs
Lst Suppressed jobs
Lt Level of employment
it =
It
Yt
Investment rate
"ct > 0 Created jobs coe¢ cients (associated with I
N
t )
"maxc Suppressed jobs coe¢ cient (associated with I
R
t )
!t Wage rate
ct Prot share
pcL; p
s
L; p!; pp Propensities to consume goods integrating new techniques related
to the various income sources (job creation and suppression, wage,
prots)
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Consumption structures and growth regimes
Asuuming that the investment rate and the prot share are independent of time, we obtain, from
Equations 3 to 9, that:
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
CNt

Yt
= pcL
(1  c) "maxc
pc
xNt| {z }+

C
N;Lc
t 
Yt
psL
(1  c) "maxc
pc
 
1  xNt
2
xNt| {z }

C
N;Ls
t 
Yt
+p! (1  c)

1  2"
max
c
pc
+
"maxc
pcxNt

| {z }

C
N;!
t
Yt
+ppc (10)
Noting e = pc"maxc (it can be proven that e > 1
45), we obtain:

CNt

Yt
=

(1  c)
e
1
xNt
(pcL + p
s
L)
 
xNt
2
+ (ep!   2 (p! + psL))xNt + (p! + psL)

+ ppc (11)
This equation means that the consumption structure depends on:
1. the growth regime (xNt );
2. the propensities to consume the products integrating the new techniques (pcL; p
s
L; p!; pp),
that is to say consumerspreferences.
We thus identied a relation between historical observations concerning consumption structure
evolution and economic theory.
Since relation (1.10) involves consumers prefences (via propensities to consume), we propose
to consider two cases:
 in the rst one, preferences are xed. This corresponds to a short or medium term analysis
of Schumpeterian growth regimes,
 in the second one, we analyse the impacts of possible shocks on the preferences.
Thus, with xed preferences, we show that consumption structures vary as indicated in Table
1.
Conditions concerning propensities to consume
products integrating the new techniques
N
tx 0 0x                 1
Si 0sLp pw+ £ ta
S i 0c sL Lp p+ >
S i 0sLp pw+ > ta
S i 0c sL Lp p+ =
S i 0sLp pw+ < ta
( )0 0t xa >
L-
L+
( )1ta
( )1ta
( )1 0t xa =
( )2 1t xa =
L- ( )1ta
( )3 0t xa =
Figure 1: Variation table of the consumption structure
In this table46 , we denote:
45 It results from the positivity of the productivity growth rate, using equation

Lt
Lt
= 1
e

Yt
Yt
 ("maxc   "ct ) it (resulting
from Equations 5 and 8).
46We did not put in the table a limit case: if psL + p! = 0 then x0 = 0.
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x0 =
s
psL + p!
pcL + p
s
L
L = +1 if psL + p! 6= 0 and L = (1  ct) p! + ppc 2 [0; 1] if psL + p! = 0
t (x0) =
(1  c)
e

2
q
(psL + p!) (p
c
L + p
s
L)  (psL + p!)

+ ep!

+ ppc > 0
t (1) = 
max
t =
1  c
e
[pcL + p! (e  1)] + ppc 2 [0; 1]
Note that t cannot be durably negative or above 1.
Using the notations introduced in Equation 10, we can explain the variations summarized in
Table 1. Its interpretation is given in Table ??47 .
Variation
when xNt
varies in [0; 1]
Interpretation

CN;Lct

Yt
Increasing An intensication of the industrial revolution induces an
increase in the number of created jobs, which is itself more
favorable to the development of products integrating the
new techniques.

CN;Lst

Yt
Increasing An intensication of the industrial revolution induces a de-
crease in the number of destroyed jobs, which is itself more
favorable to the development of products integrating the
new techniques.

CN;!t

Yt
Decreasing An intensication of the industrial revolution induces a de-
crease in the wage rate growth, which is itself less favorable
to the development of products integrating the new tech-
niques.
Table 2: Evolution of the various components of the consumption structure evolution.
This table shows the e¤ects of the adoption of a higher growth regime (i.e. of an intensication
of the industrial revolution) on the consumption of goods integrating the new techniques: the
increase in the number of created jobs and the reduction of destroyed jobs appears to be favorable
to the consumption of products integrating the new techniques while a decrease in wage growth
rate is unfavorable to new consumptions. The evolution of consumption structures then results
from this opposit e¤ects and thus depends on consumers preferences, as shown in Table 1.
When the propensities to consume vary, Equation 11 shows that dtdpX > 0, X 2 fpcL; psL; p!; ppg.
This means that the consumption structure is involving more products integrating the new tech-
niques if consumers preferences move in favor of these goods. However, these relations do not
allow us to consider the evolution of the growth regime, after a shock on the preferences. It is
what we will study now.
47An intensication of the industrial revolution means an increase of growth investments and thus stronger growth
of the production and of employment. That means that xNt grows.
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Equation 11 allows us to calculate the variation of xNt at the time of a shock on the propensities
to consume: dx
N
t
dpX
> 0, X 2 fpcL; psL; p!; ppg except when both psL + p! > 0 and xNt 2 ]0; x0[ 48 .
We showed that for a given growth regime, propensities evolution in favor of products integrat-
ing the new techniques has an impact on the evolution of consumption structure (t). Similarly,
we just checked that a shock on consumerspreferences has an impact on the growth regime itself.
4.2.2 Interpretation
To conclude with this model, let us stress the two possible cases of countries:
1. The rst case corresponds to an economy in which the employees preferences for the products
integrating the new techniques are relatively strong (psL + p! > 0) and in which the share of
growth investments is weak (xNt 2 ]0; x0]). We consider in this case that the economy did
not still truly enter the Schumpeterian growth regime (no real important technical shock49).
Then:
 Surprisingly, if the preferences (i.e. propensities to consume) do not vary, the ratio
between the consumption growth rate of products integrating the new techniques and
of the economic growth rate decrease as rms devote a larger part of their investments
to growth investments (and thus to these products). It corresponds to the cases in
which new jobs are not su¢ ciently numerous to develop new consumption habits. The
rms are thus not stimulated to reach a higher growth regime (which would have favored
employment and thus the consumption of new goods). This situation can be interpreted
as a weak growth trap.
This situation looks like the one of Europes crisis at the end of the 19th century (in
which the wage evolution allowed a category of consumers to purchase more goods
integrating the new techniques but in which employment also declined). This period
was also the one of investments in the new technical system that had been useful to
Europe to escape the weak growth trap;
 A shock on the preferences on the one hand can make the growth regime (xNt ) evolve
and on the other hand can modify the threshold which denes the weak growth trap
(x0).
 Similarly as in the previous case (in which preferences were xed), the growth regime
(xNt ) becomes lower as the preferences evolve in favor of the products integrating
the new techniques. This situation is thus unfavorable to the adoption of the new
optimal growth regime (xNt = 1).
Concerning the threshold regime (x0), we note that an increase in the preferences
for the goods integrating the new techniques of the agents getting a job (pcL) is
favorable to the economy insofar as it reduces the size of the weak growth trap (i.e.
the interval [0; x0]). On the other hand, an increase in the employees preferences
for these products is unfavorable to the adoption of a higher growth regime.
However, this case is interesting only for countries which economy is close to the
threshold (x0), because, in this case, the evolution of consumers preferences can
push the country either above or under the threshold.
48Since dx
N
t
dpX
=
dxNt
dt
dt
dpX
= 1dt
dxNt
dt
dpX
.
49Let us recall that, for us, a technical shock, in accordance with the [Mokyr, 1993] approach, is a period of
innovations di¤usion and expansion (via microinventions) that results from radical innovations (macroinventions).
We thus suppose here that the technical shock is largely related to the escape of the weak growth trap.
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2. In the second case, the economy invests su¢ ciently in the goods with strong growth potential
and thus in particular in the new techniques. We consider that in this case, the economy
faces a technical shock (

psL + p! > 0
xNt 2 ]x0; 1]

or

psL + p!  0
xNt 2 ]xi; 1] ; i 2 f1; 3g

):
 If preferences do not vary (which is generally the case in the short and medium term), a
higher growth regime results in a consumption structure evolution in favor of products
integrating the new techniques. This results in an increase of the ratio between the
consumption growth rate of products integrating the new techniques and of the economic
growth rate.
To reach the new (optimal) growth rate (i.e. the one for which the economys production
growth and employment growth is maximum, for a given investment rate), the consump-
tion structure must evolve in direction of the products integrating the new techniques
in order that the ratio between the consumption growth rate of these products and the
production growth reaches a minimal value.
In this case rms are incited to encourage consumption of products integrating the new
techniques, which is also favorable to the adoption of the optimal growth regime. Let
us see now the impact of a shock on the preferences.
 A shock on the preferences can impact the growth regime (xNt ) and it can modify the
threshold (x0) that denes the weak growth trap:
 xNt gets closer from the new optimal growth regime when preferences become more
favorable to the consumption of products integrating the new techniques. This
situation is thus favorable to the adoption of the new mode: Firms will thus promote
actively new consumption habits50 .
This case remembers us the history of electricity51 : housewives, for instance, were
trained by the companies to use the new devices.This stimulation of the consumers,
as other promotional tools, even before the great time of electric household ap-
pliances, were important aspects of rms involvment in the evolution of consumer
preferences. In this sense, we can note that the second industrial revolution had
been also demand driven: consumerschoices were crucial elements in the orienta-
tion of the industries.
The study of the threshold regime (x0) evolution (which denes the weak growth
trap), shows that it is preferable to favor the propensity increase of people getting
a job rather than the one of the other types of consumers. Once again, this remark
is only interesting for the economies located close to the threshold (x0). We still
note the importance of the consumers choices evolution in the adoption of a growth
regime.
However this model has many limits (microeconomic bases of the consumption function are
missing, as well as a system of explicit prices; the role of trade in building demand, the possibility
to test the validity of the model are also limits of this work...). It is one of these limits that we
will try to study, considering qualitatively, from a historical point of view, the role of trade in the
"demand production".
50Such evolutions should be endogeneized. Howver they remain probably very slow.
51See [Cardot, 1987, Flacher, 2003] for a more complete review about consumer and electricity.
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5 An hypothesis concerning the causes of consumption changes:
the "commercial revolutions"
We showed, within a brief historical approach, the importance of consumption structures evolution,
highlighting the succession of Smithian and Schumpeterian growth processes. Our model put to
the fore a few mechanisms operating during the Schumpeterian growth regime. We now examine
the causes of consumption patterns evolution.
5.1 Commercial revolutions and the "demand production"
5.1.1 Denition of the commercial revolution concept
Trade is the heart of the economy. But surprisingly, very few studies addressed the whole complex
trade patterns, although they may explain how can supply and demand match. This question
has been addressed by [Braudel, 1979a] with a particularly interesting and original point of view:
he decribes the economy through its three main "levels" each of them corresponding not only
to trade patterns and geographical localization, but also to distinct historical temporalities. The
"infrastructure" of the economy (or "infra-economy") corresponds to the very elementary side of
the economy (self-su¢ ciency and very short distance barter). It evolves very slowly over long
period. The second oor, the "economy" (or market) corresponds to the institutionalized trade.
Its evolution scale is the scale of a life. Finally, the "superstructure" of the economy (or "supra-
economy") corresponds to the macro-economic policies, whose changes can occur very fastly, over
short term periods.
The regulation of the economy and the infra-economy through the superstructure (the "capital-
ism") impacts the main changes in the long run. The market thus appears as a strategic position
between the infrastructure and the suprastructure.Precisely during the 18th century, with the in-
dustrial revolution that we can identify in a few countries (and particularly in England) changes
at the three levels together, for the rst time in history. Paradoxically, the long distance trade (i.e.
macroeconomic changes) developed before the unication of the market and that was particularly
important for daily patterns evolution [Polanyi, 1957].
Contrary to the [Kindleberger, 1996] which denes a commercial revolution by a commercial
expansion, we propose to dene a "commercial revolution" through major changes in trading
patterns. That means 1) new forms of distribution and intermediation and 2) their signicant
extension (at both geographical and social level). These changes which will be essential to dene
the concept of "demand production", also need 3) the emergence of new transportation techniques
and 4) trade intensication (as in [Kindleberger, 1996]s view). In other words, a commercial
revolution is characterized by changes that happen together at the three lors of the Braudelian
economy.
5.1.2 Hypothesis on "demand production" and its link with industrialization
We now consider the idea that a "commercial revolution" could be the necessary partner of each
industrial revolution. Indeed, the commercial revolutions could be the core of the "demand pro-
duction" which represents the way in which trading patterns inuence consumption habits and
preferences (just like they can inuence production). This concept appears to be particularly im-
portant if we consider that each industrial revolution is characterized by the double rupture it
generates: the advent of new production and organization patterns (new technical system), on the
one hand, and the one of new consumption habits, on the other hand. This dichotomy is historically
plausible but little studied: the chronology as well as the causality is not yet established between
the two "under-revolutions" (the commercial and the technical one), of an industrial revolution.
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An assumption should thus be considered: a commercial revolution is the change in the "demand
production" paradigm which leads to the new consumption habits and thus new consumption
structures.
These changes in the consumption habits can induce a new productive regime (it is the case in
the Smithian growth phases) or they can be stimulated when the productive regime is changing
(Schumpeterian growth phases). Technical, industrial and commercial dynamics are represented
in Figure 2.
New “demand
production” paradigm
Commercial
revolution
Scientifical and technical
conditions
Industrial
revolution
Consumption
structures changes
Technical
revolution
Commercial innovation
(commercial diffusion process)
Technical innovation
(technical diffusion process)
Figure 2: Summary of the assumptions on the link between commercial, technical and industrial
revolutions.
5.2 Commercial revolutions and productive regimes in the 1700-2000
period
5.2.1 Oversea transportation and shops in the 18th century
Until the 18th century, commercial changes concerning the supra-economy and the infra-economy
appear largely independent from each other. The commercial revolution, with our denition, is
starting only in the 18th century, when long distance oversea trade develops a link with the local
areas and shops52 : the stores progressively replace the fairs, the banks develop and compete with
the stock exchanges, the travelling merchants revolutionize local trade53 enhancing very short
distance trade, as pointed out by Braudel. But why did the various levels of the economy evolve
together since this time?
A rst explanation is related to what Mendels calls the "proto-industrialization". On the
one hand, proto-industrialization provides an additional purchasing power (favorable to the con-
sumption of industrial products, like Indian textiles). On the other hand, it largely contributes
52"The movement, beyond 1720, is undoubtedly concerning all the oors of the economy" ([Braudel, 1979b], Vol.2,
p.113). See also [Braudel, 1979b], Vol. 1, p.12-13 and p.112-113.
53 Indeed, fairs and markets, the networks of traveling shops and the other types of merchants contributed, with
the help of credit sometimes, to create new needs. For [Roche, 1988], it is a true "vestimentary revolution".
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to homogenize the national market thanks to transportation development and to generalize new
spending patterns54 thanks to the trade develoment between cities and campaigns.Thus proto-
industrialization transformed trading patterns through all the levels of the Braudelian economy. It
also developed key markets for industrialization (like the one of Indian texiles). Finally the cities
played a crucial role in demand production since self production is necessarily limited, mainly since
cities have "prescribed" new consumption habits and promoted fashion standards.
The other explanatory dimension of the 18th century commercial revolution is foreign trade with
particularly strong intensication in England: the production for export increased by almost 550%
in one century, whereas the production for the domestic market increased by "only" 52%55 . Foreign
trade also provides a plausible explanation of the national di¤erences regarding the industrial
revolution [Kindleberger, 1996]: it can involve national industries (as in England) or not involve
them (as in Holland, with warehouse trade). Contrary to Amsterdam, London was thus at the
same time at the core of an important trade foreign network and at the core of a domestic economy.
The three levels of the economy were thus involved together there.
The English industrial revolution appeared thus after a commercial revolution with two clearly
visible components: the development of foreign trade and the creation of a more homogeneous
domestic market. This is due to large cities, with a high density of shops and with fairs and
markets higher frequency. The French behavior is located in an intermediate situation: trade
deeveloped quickly in the 18th century but mainly in the principal sea-ports: only the Rouens
trade has important links with the local industry and until the 18th century, Paris is a warehouse at
the center of a centralized sales network. Lastly, Germany su¤ered from the great disparity of the
regions development, a lack of homogeneity of the national market (at least until the development
of the railroads), organisational heavinesses and geopolitical and historical problems.
This analysis shows the importance of the various components of our denition of the commer-
cial revolution understanding demand production which is necessary to industrialization. These
elements are summarized in Table 4.
5.2.2 Railway and department stores in the 19th century
Manufactured goods take more and more importance during the 19th century. The rise of transport
and communications and the development of department stores contribute to unify much more
the national markets. These evolution produces a new wave of demand for products of the rst
industrialization, preparing at the same time the population to mass consumption that is about
to born, with the second industrialization.
The rst important aspect of this revolution is transportation: It builds integrated markets
from the local to the international level. Progresses are important since 1830 in the use of roads
and in the use of travellers and goods coaches. It will be more signicant with the railroads
development. Indeed [Gervais, 1995] considers that the second phase of industrialization was born
in the United States from a "transport revolution" and a "market revolution"56 during the years
1820-1940. Industrialization would not thus be explained by the (only) technical progress but by
more intensive cost cuttings and productivity gains, resulting from the "commercial revolution".
This period is characterized by the collapse of many monopolistic rms which beneted from a
regional specialization due to lack of transportation development.
When transports develop, they also revolutionize directly consumption habits, producing a new
demand that nobody waited for during the second half of the 19th century, especially concerning
54See [Roche, 1988], p.477-488. It is worth noting that textile consumption also induced the production for
a related demand: the maintenance and cleaning of the textile goods which is not completely done inside the
household when in the cities or big villages (development of laundry...).
55 [Braudel, 1979a], Vol. 3, p.503.
56 [Gervais, 1995], p.336.
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leisures57 . Thereafter, this demand will be favorable to the car boom since cars appeared to
be a good substitution product. The rise of consumer credit (in particular "hire-purchases") is
another element of the commercial revolution which starts in the middle of the 19th century in
Europe (a little behind the United States58). It has been a signicant help for retailing59 . But the
development of department stores, in parallel with the one of transport and the communications,
is probably the key changes characterizing this commercial revolution60 , born in the center cities,
where fashion and consumption standards emerge.
This revolution does not bring very new things but the systematization of many commercial
habits61 . Thus, since 1852, with the "Bon marché", Boucicaut immediately introduces free en-
trance, xed and displayed prices and the possibility for the purchaser to return goods if he is not
satised62 . Four great innovations were also largely developed63 1) a policy of low and discount
prices (prots are seeked through high volumes); 2) the creation of a single structure for various
products, with entertainments (frequent and regular modications of the departments structure,
shows, places to meet people...) and putting to the fore the luxury and modernity of the store (el-
evators, electricity64 ...); 3) avertisement was then understood as an essential tool for the di¤usion
of new mass consumption habits; 4) nally, the mail order business was one of the major aspects of
the department stores development: department stores decided to go towards the consumer, in the
campaigns and abroad. These changes are mainly characterized by new forms of intermediation
where the relation "client/seller" is replaced by the less personal relation "client/products". They
were quickly extended, in the following years, to the whole retailing. Therefore, department stores
constitute a real commercial revolution that induced new consumption habits.
This revolution, that started in the middle of the 19th century, had thus a major impact
on the creation of a new demand, necessary to the Schumpeterian growth regime of the rst
industrialization. It also had a major impact on the emergence of the second industrialization
phase, at the end of the century.
5.2.3 Cars, supermarkets and malls in the 20th century
The third commercial revolution is associated to the Fordist growth regime identied by the reg-
ulation school. This regime is based at the same time on the advent new transport tool (the
car) and of a new distribution institutions (supermarkets and malls). For [Galbraith, 1972] these
changes can be associated to a new demand production paradigm: The rms now directly inuence
consumers behavior (the specic demand) whereas the State plays a role in inuencing the "total"
demand.
The commercial revolution thus comes mainly from the supermarket and malls networks which
emerge for several reasons: as for department stores during the 19th century, a fast demographic
growth, a strong urbanization, a signicant economic growth play a fundamental role. However, it
is necessary to consider also, on the one hand, the migration from the center cities to the suburbs
57See also [Toutain, 1971]. This element is capital since it constitutes an argument against the counter-factual
methods of the New Economic History: it is indeed criticizable to evaluate passengers transportation cost without
train since the train contributed to create new consumption habits closely associated with this means of transporta-
tion.
58See [Fraser, 1981].
59See [Gelpi and Julien-Labruyère, 1994].
60Two of the three main commercial ruptures are located, according to [Marseille, 1997], at this time. In France,
the three ruptures he identies are happening during the years 1820-1860 with the "magasins de nouveauté", during
the time following the crisis (1880-1910) with the "department stores" and nally since the years 1960s with the
supermarkets and malls.
61See [Bouveret-Gauer, 1997].
62See [Miller, 1981].
63Concerning all these aspects, see [Du Closel, 1989, Marseille, 1997, Miller, 1981].
64See [Miller, 1981], p.156-157.
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and, on the other hand, the avaolability of new goods to help the consumers to consume (particu-
larly the refrigerator and more and more the cars). These factors contribute to the development of
a distribution that is able to support the ow generated by the mass production65 . For this reason,
the commercial revolution looks like an aspect of Fordism, adapting and systematizing commer-
cual uses66 : 1) It takes the department stores idea of ordering concentration and of possible scale
and scope economies; 2) it takes from popular stores the idea of labor saving organizations (in
particular through "self-service" and through a minimum and standardized commercial service).
Supermarkets and malls use these methods intensively and implement more "scientic" manage-
ment methods and labor organization: The chain, the labor division by functions, a few managers
designing the stores policies (advertisement, discount...).
Deeply linkeg to new types of transports, supermarkets and malls can be considered as a
"commercial revolution": We can identify new forms of intermediation between supply and demand,
trade intensies and, nally, this revolution involves all the levels of the Braudelian economy. For
these reasons, we can consider that supermarkets and malls took a major part in the evolution of
consumption structures.
5.2.4 And now?
The question of the link between consumption structures and industrial revolutions is a key question
for political economy also because it helps us to understand the recent economic changes. For
instance, the di¤usion of information and communications technologies in the last decade raises
the question of the emergence of a new technical cycle, and of a new productive regime.
The "new economy" brought promising perspectives before an important crisis. Many econo-
mists and observers deduces from that crisis that ICT cannot be compared to the previous technical
revolutions. They would be simple technologies of substitution, handicapped by their costs, not
able to transform our societies.
However, as underlined by [Artus, 2000], the new economy is a complex phenomenon that
must however be relativized for several reasons. Initially the new economy did not a¤ect all
the developed countries in the same way, the United States being more an exception than the
general case. Then the impact of new techniques on the accumulation process and on trade
organization remains fuzzy. Finally theorists of the new economy mainly studied the supply side
when explaining this long period of strong and noninationary growth in the United States. The
evolution of consumption structure was not much studied. However information transport could
induce a commercial revolution.
It seems thus necessary to look at consumption side and not only at supply side if we want
to understand the current changes. Are technical changes able to meet or to induce consumers
desires and thus to deeply modify spending patterns? The commercial revolution that induces
this evolution probably already began. But it will take more time than many analysts thought to
inuence peoples consumption habits
5.2.5 Synthesis: industrial revolutions and demand production
History is characterized by three main phases of evolution of the spending patterns: the "consumer
revolution" in the 18th century, the "consumer goods revolution" in the 19th century and the
65A few data provided by [Du Closel, 1989], p.18: 1) French population grew of 15 millions people between 1946
and 1956. 2) While 54% of French people are living inside cities in 1946, they are nearly 80% in 1956. 3) Consumption
is three times more important in volume in 1956 than in 1946. 4) Suburbs grew much more than center cities. 5)
1,7 millions of cars are used in 1946 but 22 millions in 1988. 7% of the families have a refrigerator in 1953 but 97%
in 1987... Cars to reach the supermarkets and malls and refrigerators at home were two key aspects of the fordist
era, which were funamental for the rise for mass consumption.
66See [Du Closel, 1989, Marseille, 1997].
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"mass consumption revolution" in the 20th century. These three revolutions seem largely related
to the emergence of "commercial revolutions". These commercial revolutions are characterized by
major evolutions concerning transports and distribution that produce a new demand. The rst
commercial revolution rests mainly on oversea transportation and on shops, the second one rests on
the advent railroads and department stores and the third one rests on the car and of supermarkets
and malls.
If an important explanation of the evolution of consumption structure can be found in the
commercial revolution concept, these evolutions are closely related to industrialization processes:
the "Smithian" growth regime is demand driven; "Schumpeterian" growth regime is supply driven.
This regime must then generate a commercial revolution to develop the necessary types of con-
sumption that rms are wainting for. There would thusbe , through the last three centuries, a
dialectical sequence of "Smithian" and "Schumpeterian" growth regimes, of commercial revolutions
and of productive processes, as summarized in Figure 3, Table 4 and Figure 5.
1st productive regime 2nd productive regime 3rd productive
regime
1st commercial revolution/ 1st
consumption revolution
2nd commercial revolution/ 2nd
consumption revolution
3rd commercial revolution/
3rd consumption revolution
?
1650 1780 1850 1880 1930/1960 1990
Figure 3: Chronology of industrial, commercial revolutions and productive regimes.
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related to the 2nd IR
goods and
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?
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Figure 4: Commercial revolutions productive regimes: a synthesis.
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COMMERCIAL
REVOLUTION
Industrial revolution
(Schumpeterian
growth process)
New consumption habits
(Smithian growth process)
Technical
progress
Figure 5: Diagram of the link between commercial revolutions, industrial revolutions, consumption
and technical progress.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we addressed the question of the role of consumption structure evolution in the
industrialization phases of the Western world since the 18th century. We proposed a double answer
to this question: This evolution plays initially a key role in the adoption of the new techniques.
Indeed, at each period of industrialization, a "Smithian" growth process is characterized by a
demand driven growth which stimulates the adoption of new techniques. A "Schumpeterian"
growth process emerges from this adoption of new techniques. This is characterized by a supply
driven growth, the demand side being a limitation to growth. However, as shown in our model, the
evolution of consumption structures also plays a role in the Schumpeterian growth process since
it contributes to dene the growth path of the economy and thus the intensity of the industrial
revolution once new techniques are available and accessible to all. Lastly, following a qualitative
historical analysis, we also suggest that the commercial revolutions play a central role in the
transformation of the spending patterns, and that they are largely determined (except for the rst
industrialization) by the Schumpeterian growth processes.
Perspectives for future work could the improvement of the model by introducing a production
function involving explicitely two sectors and a system of prices. We could also endogenize com-
mercial variables: This could allow us to capture all the phases of an industrial revolutions. We
could nally collect relevant data, if available, in order to validate the hypotheses and conclusions
obtained with the proposed model.
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